Judges Should Write Their Own Opinions

by William Domnarski

New York Times
May 31, 2012

There is a crisis in the federal appellate judiciary. No, I’m not referring to the high number of judicial vacancies or overloaded case dockets — though those are real problems. The crisis I have in mind rarely is discussed because it raises too many embarrassing questions. I’m talking about the longstanding and well-established practice of having law clerks ghostwrite judges’ legal opinions. We have become too comfortable with the troubling idea that judging does not require that judges do their own work.

With so much news and controversy about what federal appellate judges say in their opinions, it would be natural for a layperson to assume that such opinions actually come from judges’ own pens (or keyboards). But ever since the beginning of the law-clerk age, which dates back at least 70 years, most judges have been content to cast their vote in a case and then merely outline the shape of their argument — while leaving it to their clerks to do the hard work of shaping the language, researching the relevant precedents and so on. Almost all federal appellate judges today follow this procedure.

There are, of course, understandable reasons for this arrangement. For one thing, it’s efficient: it helps judges manage the ever increasing flow of cases to be decided. It’s also familiar: it resembles the modern law-firm model (known to many judges from earlier stages in their careers) in which associates draft documents and senior partners edit them. Furthermore, the law is not a literary pursuit but a system of rules, principles and arguments: in a legal opinion the fine points of language can seem less important than the underlying logic of the decision.

But in truth, much of importance is lost when judges outsource the writing of their opinions to their less experienced assistants. Judge-written opinions require greater intellectual rigor, exhibit more personal style and lend themselves to more honest and transparent conclusions.

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Our Imbecilic Constitution

by Sanford Levinson

New York Times
May 28, 2012

Advocating the adoption of the new Constitution drafted in Philadelphia, the authors of The Federalist Papers mocked the “imbecility” of the weak central government created by the Articles of Confederation.

Nearly 225 years later, critics across the spectrum call the American political system dysfunctional, even pathological. What they don’t mention, though, is the role of the Constitution itself in generating the pathology.

Ignore, for discussion’s sake, the clauses that helped to entrench chattel slavery until it was eliminated by a brutal Civil War. Begin with the Senate and its assignment of equal voting power to California and Wyoming; Vermont and Texas; New York and North Dakota. Consider that, although a majority of Americans since World War II have registered opposition to the Electoral College, we will participate this year in yet another election that “battleground states” will dominate while the three largest states will be largely ignored.

Our vaunted system of “separation of powers” and “checks and balances” — a legacy of the founders’ mistrust of “factions” — means that we rarely have anything that can truly be described as a “government.” Save for those rare instances when one party has hefty control over four branches — the House of Representatives, the Senate, the White House and the Supreme Court — gridlock threatens. Elections are increasingly meaningless, at least in terms of producing results commensurate with the challenges facing the country.

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An ever-deeper democratic deficit

Economist
May 26, 2012

For the past six decades, steps forward to greater European union have taken place at moments of incipient crisis. None, though, has been taken in a time of disaster. The next leap in integration looks set to change that. All the plausible solutions to the self-inflicted mess of the euro crisis require a significant new level of fiscal and potentially political union, not least because some countries, such as Germany, actively want greater political union and see it as the price of their co-operation. In order to make any such solution work, Europe’s elites will have to address a problem they have long shirked: that of the democratic deficit at the heart of integration. And they will have to do so under the worst of conditions.

The past week’s near-continuous high-level summitry has done little to reduce the risk of a Greek exit from the euro, which rose to higher levels than ever after the inconclusive results of the country’s election on May 6th. The risk shows no signs of receding before the next vote, on June 17th. After that, risk may become reality (see article).

A consensus is slowly emerging that, whether a Greek exit is to be averted or weathered, there will have to be a greater level of integration in the euro zone, with tighter constraints on the freedom of national governments. Some countries, under some conditions, may put up with seeing their governments so constrained for a while: Italy and Greece (until recently) have had unelected, technocratic prime ministers, in large part as a result of pressure from outside creditors. But elsewhere, and in the long run, people seem likely to want to do the constraining they think proper by means of the ballot box, rather than having it forced upon them.

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Οι «δημοκρατικοί» αντίπαλοι της Δημοκρατίας

του Πάσχου Μανδραβέλη

Καθημερινή
13 Μαΐου 2012

Η Δημοκρατία δεν ευλογεί την παραβίαση των κανόνων συμβίωσης, απλώς επιτρέπει σε όλους να συμμετάσχουν στον ορισμό αυτών των κανόνων.

«Σε μια δημοκρατία», έγραψε ο Αμερικανός δικαστής Φίλιξ Φρανκφούρτερ, «το υψηλότερο αξίωμα είναι αυτό του πολίτη». Αυτό είναι μια άλλη ανάγνωση του πρώτου άρθρου στα συντάγματα όλων των χωρών, που περίπου λένε ό,τι και το ελληνικό: «Θεμέλιο του πολιτεύματος είναι η λαϊκή κυριαρχία. Ολες οι εξουσίες πηγάζουν από τον λαό...». Αυτό δεν σημαίνει ότι κάθε πολίτης από μόνος, κατέχοντας το υψηλότερο αξίωμα, μπορεί να κάνει ό,τι γουστάρει, αλλά οι περισσότεροι πολίτες μαζί ορίζουν την τύχη μιας χώρας· είτε προς το καλύτερο είτε προς το χειρότερο.

Την περασμένη Κυριακή, οι Ελληνες άσκησαν την ύψιστη εξουσία τους και ίσως πρέπει να ξεκαθαρίσουμε μερικά πράγματα. Και αυτό, διότι όπως συμβαίνει και με όλα τα άλλα πράγματα, στην Ελλάδα και η έννοια της δημοκρατίας έχει κακοποιηθεί τόσο πολύ ώστε τα πάντα κατέληξαν πολτός. Τα πολιτικά δικαιώματα συγχέονται με τα ατομικά· ο νόμος της πλειοψηφίας με το «δίκιο» μιας τάξης· η υποχρέωση τήρησης των νόμων με το δικαίωμα (υπό όρους) της πολιτικής ανυπακοής· η δημοκρατία με την οχλοκρατία· η πολιτική με τον χουλιγκανισμό· το δικαίωμα της ελευθερίας του λόγου με τις βιαιότητες· το δικαίωμα της συνάθροισης με τις καταλήψεις· η νόμιμη βία, που οφείλει να ασκεί τηρώντας τους κανόνες το κράτος, με την παράνομη βία εκείνου που θεωρεί ότι αδικείται.

Το αποτέλεσμα αυτής της ιδεολογικής θολούρας αποτυπώνεται στην καθημερινότητά μας και στην κατάσταση που βρίσκεται η χώρα σήμερα. Υμνώντας τη δημοκρατία, φτάσαμε στην τυραννία των μειοψηφιών, που αποτρέπουν βιαίως την εφαρμογή των νόμων, στο όνομα ενός «ανώτερου» και αυτοπροσδιοριζόμενου «δίκιου» το οποίο ορίζεται ανάλογα με τα γούστα ή τις ιδεοληψίες καθενός κι αδιαφορώντας για τις προτεραιότητες των άλλων.

Ομως, η δημοκρατία δεν είναι ένα σύστημα απόλυτης ελευθερίας· είναι το πιο ελεύθερο σύστημα που έχουμε γνωρίσει μέχρι τώρα. Δεν ευλογεί την παραβίαση των κανόνων συμβίωσης, απλώς επιτρέπει σε όλους να συμμετάσχουν στον ορισμό αυτών των κανόνων. Δεν είναι ένα σύστημα που επιτρέπει στις μειοψηφίες να κάνουν ό,τι θέλουν· είναι ένα σύστημα που επιτρέπει στις μειοψηφίες να λένε ό,τι θέλουν, έτσι ώστε να πείσουν και να γίνουν με τη σειρά τους κάποια στιγμή πλειοψηφία για να ορίσουν τους κανόνες. Δεν επιτρέπει καν στην πλειοψηφία να κάνει ό,τι θέλει. Υπάρχουν τα θεμελιώδη δικαιώματα κάθε ατόμου, που δεν μπορεί να καταπατήσει ούτε το 99,9% του υπόλοιπου λαού.

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Does the Law Matter in China?

by Nicholas Bequelin

New York Times
May 13, 2012

Does the law matter in China? A cursory look at the two crises that have hit the Chinese government in recent weeks — one at the very top, with the purge of Bo Xilai, and one at the grassroots, with the escape from unlawful house arrest of the blind activist Chen Guangcheng — suggests not.

The two cases have in common an overt and blatant disregard for legality, an unwillingness of the central government to correct manifest injustices, and the notion that only U.S. diplomatic compounds are safe-havens in China.

Bo, the maverick princeling, turned a brutal anti-mafia campaign in the southwestern metropolis of Chongqing into an instrument of personal power designed to garner popularity through swift “justice” and to eliminate political rivals. His suspension by the Party’s Central Committee came only after his police chief took refuge in the United States Consulate.

Chen, the dauntless rural activist from Shandong province, had attempted to use the existing legal system to expose wide-ranging abuses of power by local officials, only to be sentenced in 2006 to more than four years in prison on trumped-up charges by a local court. Upon his release in September 2010, local officials and hired thugs unlawfully kept him confined in his home. He too, after dramatically escaping his captors, sought refuge in a U.S. diplomatic enclave.

Both cases are widely seen as emblematic. Bo’s embodies the corruption of an unchecked political elite: Communist Party members are investigated by the party’s own disciplinary committee, and not by the courts. Chen’s case is rife with the predatory behavior of local officials whose conduct is more reminiscent of China’s feudal past than of the “new socialist countryside” Beijing leaders claim to be building.

Yet it would be a mistake to conclude that the law doesn't matter in China.

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