From crisis to constitution

by Thorvaldur Gylfason

Vox
October 11, 2011

As economic protests continue throughout Europe, many wonder whether such efforts will be in vain. This column explores what happened in Iceland, where a “pots-and-pans” revolution in response to the devastating financial crisis gave rise to a new constitution.

Political upheaval is the most common precursor of constitutional change. The collapse of communism in 1989 produced a large number of new constitutions in East and Central Europe and Asia (Elster 1995). Economic crises are less common triggers of constitutional change. The Great Depression did not prompt the Americans to change their constitution – changes of the law, such as the Glass-Steagall Act of 1933, were thought sufficient.

Pots and pans

Iceland’s spectacular financial collapse in October 2008 was, in effect, political as well as economic. One of the most vocal demands of the “pots-and-pans” revolution that led to a change of government in early 2009 was for a new constitutional order, a new republic even, to replace the provisional constitution from 1944 when Iceland unilaterally separated from occupied Denmark.

The new parliament promised at once to quickly revise the provisional document, essentially a translation of the Danish constitution with a nationally elected president with potentially significant powers substituted for a monarch. This promise was not kept, however, except for a few minor revisions to adjust the article on parliamentary elections to demographic changes, to transit from a bicameral parliament to a unicameral one, and to append, in 1995, some new articles on human rights.

The demand of the pots and pans for an overhaul of the constitution was a demand that the political class – discredited by the collapse of the banks to which it had been so close and so generous[1] – eventually honour the promise it had for so long failed to keep. In its own interest, the political class wanted the constitution to continue to preserve the significant bias of the electoral system in favour of the provinces to safeguard their overrepresentation in parliament (Gylfason et al. 2010, 7,140). The parties behaved as pressure groups of political insiders.

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