Η ευσυνειδησία καλλιεργείται

Συνέντευξη της Lynn Stout στην Κατερίνα Οικονομάκου

Ελευθεροτυπία
30 Δεκεμβρίου 2010

Ο άνθρωπος δεν είναι λύκος για τον άνθρωπο, λέει η Λιν Στάουτ, η οποία διδάσκει στη Σχολή Νομικής του UCLA, διαβεβαιώνοντας πως η επιστήμη αποδεικνύει ότι ο Τόμας Χομπς έσφαλλε όταν έλεγε εκείνο το περίφημο: Homo Homini Lupus. «Τουλάχιστον, αυτό δεν ισχύει για τη μεγάλη πλειονότητα των ανθρώπων. Συνήθως είμαστε καλύτεροι από ό,τι υποθέτει ο Χομπς», λέει.

Στο νέο της βιβλίο, με τίτλο Cultivating Conscience: How Good Laws Make Good People («Καλλιεργώντας τη Συνείδηση. Πώς οι καλοί νόμοι φτιάχνουν καλούς ανθρώπους») εξηγεί ότι, στο σωστό περιβάλλον, επιτρέπουμε στους εαυτούς μας να φέρουν στην επιφάνεια την πιο καλή πλευρά μας. Και υποδεικνύει τα τρία βήματα αλλαγής που πρέπει να κάνει μια κοινωνία εάν είναι αποφασισμένη να ασχοληθεί με την καλλιέργεια και της φορολογικής συνείδησης των μελών της.

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What philosophy can do for the world

Telegraph (Calcuttta, India)
December 16, 2010

The eminent thinker, Martha Nussbaum, speaks to Somak Ghoshal on education, emotions and the enduring legacy of Rabindranath Tagore.

Philosophers are supposed to be reclusive souls who prefer to keep themselves busy high up in their ivory towers — not at the ironing board. However, Martha Nussbaum, Ernst Freund Distinguished Service Professor of Law and Ethics at Chicago University, begs to differ. When I called in for her at a city hotel last week, a few minutes early for my appointment, she was ironing her clothes, getting ready for a long day, in the course of which she delivered a keynote address on Rabindranath Tagore at a panel discussion. But she had still found time for a brisk workout at the gym. “I love to exercise,” she confessed, looking strikingly fit for her 63 years. Nussbaum had once said that the American actress, Candice Bergen, should play her in a film on her life. After my first few minutes with her, I was willing to agree.

It would not have been odd for Nussbaum to become a famous actress anyway. At 11, she played Joan of Arc in a school play, wrote another one on Robespierre, in French, where she played the title role. She even started out as a student of theatre at New York University, before choosing to train as a classicist. “I thought as an actress I would be able to have broader emotional experiences,” she says, “but then, I quickly figured out that I wanted to think about tragic dramas, not act in them.” Even in her Robespierre play, she was more interested in the “conflict between high ideals and personal friendship”, in exploring the idea that “universal ideals must be balanced against a love of particulars”.

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Mιά Ρεαλιστική Ουτοπία: από τον Κant στον Rawls

του Στέλιου Βιρβιδάκη

Σύγχρονα Θέματα
τεύχος 91 (Οκτ. - Δεκ. 2005)

Είναι γνωστή η ουσιαστική οφειλή του Rawls στην καντιανή πρακτική φιλοσοφία. Στα περισσότερα έργα του υπαρχουν ρητές ή υπόρρητες αναφορές στα σχετικά κείμενα του Κant2. Ετσι, και στην εισαγωγή του εκτενούς δοκιμίου του Το δίκαιο των λαών, που δημοσιεύτηκε στην πλήρη μορφή του το 1999, προτείνει να ακολουθήσουμε τον δρόμο του Kant, όπως τον σκιαγράφησε ο ίδιος στο Για την αιώνια ειρήνη και την ιδέα του περί μιας ομοσπονδίας των λαών νοούμενης ως foedus pacificum3. Και σε αρκετά σημεία κατά την ανάπτυξη της επιχειρηματολογίας του παραπέμπει σε συγκεκριμένες θέσεις του κλασικού καντιανού κειμένου που εμπνέει την προσπάθειά του να εφαρμόσει τις αρχές της φιλελεύθερης θεωρίας του στο διεθνές δίκαιο και την παγκόσμια πολιτική σκηνή.

Ωστόσο, είναι πολύ φυσικό να πάρχουν σημαντικές αποκλίσεις ανάμεσα στο ρωλσιανό εγχείρημα και το πρότυπό του. Mπορεί κανείς να πιστέψει πως και μόνο η χρονική απόσταση και η εξέλιξη των αντιλήψεων από την χρυσή εποχή του διαφωτισμού μέχρι τα τέλη του εικοστού αιώνα συνεπάγονται την αναθεώρηση των αυστηρών αρχών του συγγραφέα της Κριτικής του πρακτικού λόγου. Η διαφορετική ερμηνεία τους υπαγορεύεται από την αλλαγή του μεταφυσικού υποβάθρου και του γενικότερου μεθοδολογικού πλαισίου και καθιστά δυνατή την καλύτερη προσαρμογή τους στις απαιτήσεις της σύγχρονης ηθικής και πολιτικής θεωρίας. Η συμβολαιοκρατική θεώρηση του Rawls συμφωνεί σε πολλά σημεία αλλά και απομακρύνεται από την σύλληψη του ηθικού νόμου κατά τον Kant4. Ομως το Για την αιώνια ειρήνη ήδη απέχει πολύ από την Κριτική του πρακτικού λόγου και ξεκινά από τις πραγματιστικότερες αντιλήψεις που αποκρυσταλλώνονται στην Rechtslehre της Μεταφυσικής των ηθών5. Στην εργασία που ακολουθεί θα προσπαθήσω να απομονώσω ορισμένα από τα κυριότερα σημεία συνέχειας αλλά και διαφοροποίησης της προβληματικής του Δικαίου των λαών από το αρχικό πλαίσιο του Για την αιώνια ειρήνη. Κεντρικός άξονας της ανάλυσής μου θα είναι η διερεύνηση της έννοιας της «ρεαλιστικής ουτοπίας» στην οποία επιμένει ο Rawls. Τα ερωτήματα που θα με απασχολήσουν αφορούν το ακριβές περιεχόμενο και το πρακτικό της αντίκρισμα. Το ζήτημα βέβαια στο οποίο ανάγονται τελικά αυτά τα ερωτήματα αφορά το κατά πόσον το μοντέλο ρύθμισης των διεθνών σχέσεων που εισηγείται ο Rawls στο Δίκαιο των λαών μπορεί να θεωρηθεί πραγματικά ρεαλιστικό. Σε κάθε περίπτωση, οι προτάσεις του συνιστούν μια από τις πιο ενδιαφέρουσες αναδιατυπώσεις, προεκτάσεις και συγκεκριμενοποιήσεις του καντιανού οράματος, ενός οράματος που εξακολουθεί να αποτελεί πολύτιμη παρακαταθήκη για τις συζητήσεις της εποχής μας. Η μελέτη τους μας επιτρέπει να ξαναδούμε από κοντά και να αποτιμήσουμε την δυναμική της σκέψης του Κant.

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Prosecuting Terrorists in Federal Court

New York Times
Room for Debate
November 19, 2010

Ahmed Ghailani was convicted on Wednesday in federal court on one count of conspiracy related to the 1998 embassy bombings in Africa. The jury acquitted him on more than 280 other charges, including every count of murder. He will face 20 years to life in prison for that one charge.

The mixed verdict has re-ignited the debate over the Obama administration’s effort to handle terrorism prosecutions in the criminal justice system. Critics said the verdict proved that civilian courts could not be trusted to handle the prosecution of Al Qaeda terrorists.

What does the Ghailani case and verdict tell us about whether federal court is an appropriate forum for trying Guantánamo detainees?

"A Fair Trial, Without Torture's Taint"
David Cole, Georgetown University Law Center

"What This Means for Other Cases"
Robert Chesney, University of Texas School of Law

"Justice Was Not Done"
Andrew C. McCarthy, National Review

"A Proper Conviction"
Diane Marie Amann, U.C. Davis School of Law

"Create a Hybrid Court"
Glenn M. Sulmasy, law professor, U.S. Coast Guard Academy

"Be Cautious About Drawing Lessons"
Orin Kerr, George Washington Law School

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Thank the Courts

by Linda Greenhouse

New York Times
November 18, 2010

“America has reached a fork in the road, and the time has come to make a decisive choice,” Daniel J. Popeo, chairman of the Washington Legal Foundation, wrote this week in his monthly column in The Washington Examiner. The choice he posited was between continuing to endure judicial intervention in the conduct of the war on terrorism and “returning control over national and homeland security decisions to the executive and legislative branches.”

I don’t mean to single out the Washington Legal Foundation, a respected conservative research and litigation organization. It is hardly alone in its ritualized framing of a dichotomy between law and national security.

And that’s the point. That the courts — and the lawyers who bring cases to them — are a threat to the country is a trope that has penetrated deep into public consciousness. The typical accompanying warning against “Miranda rights for terrorists” resonates with the doom-saying of an earlier generation of conservatives to the effect that courts make it impossible to keep the streets safe from common criminals.

Now, as then, politicians who would stand up for the courts do so at their peril, or presumed peril. Mark the Obama administration’s painful indecision about what to do with the self-described mastermind of 9/11, Khalid Shaikh Mohammed, as Exhibit A. A New York jury’s acquittal this week of Ahmed Ghailani, the accused embassy bomber, on all but one of many charges provided an utterly predictable platform for Republican politicians to denounce the use of civilian courts to try terrorism cases.

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Egos on the Bench

by Dahlia Lithwick

Slate
November 17, 2010

Imagine an America plunged into a recession, with a president attempting to implement progressive reforms while an intransigent Supreme Court defiantly protects the interests of big business. Now imagine that same president is given the opportunity to fill not just one or two but nine Supreme Court seats over his tenure, and to fill those seats with some of the leading progressive lawyers and thinkers of the time. Quite a thought experiment, no? Imagine a present-day Supreme Court comprised of people like Pam Karlan, Harold Koh, Amy Klobuchar (insert your own "liberal Scalia" here).

Breathe deep, my Federalist Society friends. It's still just a thought experiment.

But this was precisely the scenario faced by Franklin Roosevelt in 1937 when he first tried to pack the Supreme Court with liberal jurists. He sought to replace the "nine old men" who persistently blocked progressive legislation with the great legal liberal minds of his time. And thus this is the thought experiment to which one can't help but return throughout Noah Feldman's terrific new book Scorpions: The Battles and Triumphs of FDR's Great Supreme Court Justices. What does it mean when a president boldly attempts to reshape American constitutional thought? Did FDR's four "great" Supreme Court appointees, who all served together from 1941 through 1954—Felix Frankfurter, Robert Jackson, Hugo Black, and William O. Douglas—redefine liberal constitutional thought? Having been selected to constitute some kind of liberal dream team—an FDR-stamped and certified Miracle on Ice—did they vanquish conservative jurisprudential thought for all time?

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Reforming Afghanistan’s Broken Judiciary

International Crisis Group
Asia Report N°195
November 17, 2010

Afghanistan’s justice system is in a catastrophic state of disrepair. Despite repeated pledges over the last nine years, the majority of Afghans still have little or no access to judicial institutions. Lack of justice has destabilised the country and judicial institutions have withered to near non-existence. Many courts are inoperable and those that do function are understaffed. Insecurity, lack of proper training and low salaries have driven many judges and prosecutors from their jobs. Those who remain are highly susceptible to corruption. Indeed, there is very little that is systematic about the legal system, and there is little evidence that the Afghan government has the resources or political will to tackle the challenge. The public, consequently, has no confidence in the formal justice sector amid an atmosphere of impunity. A growing majority of Afghans have been forced to accept the rough justice of Taliban and criminal powerbrokers in areas of the country that lie beyond government control.

To reverse these trends, the Afghan government and international community must prioritise the rule of law as the primary pillar of a vigorous counter-insurgency strategy that privileges the protection of rights equally alongside the protection of life. Restoration of judicial institutions must be at the front and centre of the strategy aimed at stabilising the country. The Afghan government must do more to ensure that judges, prosecutors and defence attorneys understand enough about the law to ensure its fair application. Reinvigoration of the legal review process and the adoption of a more dynamic, coordinated approach to justice sector reform are critical to changing the system. Justice is at the core of peace in Afghanistan and international engagement must hew to the fundamental goal of restoring the balance of powers in government and confronting governmental abuses, past and present. Urgent action is also needed to realign international assistance to strengthen support for legal education, case management, data collection and legal aid.

Legal institutions and legal elites have been deeply affected by the political paroxysms of more than three decades of conflict. The judiciary has been scarred by a legacy of political interference by both Afghan powerbrokers and external actors. Judicial independence has, as a result, been one of the main casualties of Afghanistan’s protracted war. The courts, for years, have suffered manipulation from an executive branch that has abused the law to fortify its position in the ongoing tussles between the secular and religious, the centre and periphery, the rich and poor. The Afghan government’s historic inability and persistent unwillingness to resolve conflicts between state codes, Islamic law and customary justice embedded in the legal culture have further destabilised the country. The critical leverage provided to fundamentalists in the constitution has concurrently had a deep impact on the evolution of legal institutions.

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Ηθική και βιοηθική

της Μυρτώς Δραγώνα-Μονάχου

Επιστήμη & Κοινωνία
τ. 8-9, Άνοιξη-Φθινόπωρο 2002

Το εισαγωγικό αυτό άρθρο επιχειρεί να φωτίσει την έννοια της βιοηθικής ως διεπιστημονικού κλάδου της εφαρμοσμένης ηθικής, που τα τελευταία χρόνια βρίσκεται συνεχώς στο προσκήνιο, και να δείξει την εγγενή σχέση της με την ηθική φιλοσοφία και πρακτική και τη συνάφειά της με τα ανθρώπινα δικαιώματα. Ως όρος η βιοηθική επινοήθηκε πριν από τριάντα χρόνια, χρησιμοποιήθηκε αρχικά σε ευρεία έννοια όπως συμβαίνει σπάνια και σήμερα βαθμηδόν συρρικνώθηκε ως μετεξέλιξη της ιατρικής ηθικής και στις μέρες μας κατέληξε αυτόνομη και σύνθετη ηθικο-κοινωνική οικουμενική δραστηριότητα. Καίτοι καθιερώθηκε ως ο σημαντικότερος κλάδος της εφαρμοσμένης ηθικής και αποκρυσταλλώθηκε ως έρευνα των ηθικών προβλημάτων και διλημμάτων που προκύπτουν από την ιλιγγιώδη ανάπτυξη των βιοεπιστημών και της βιοτεχνολογίας, συχνά αμφισβητείται η αρμοδιότητα και μεθοδολογία της γιατί δεν αντιμετωπίζεται πάντα ως εφαρμοσμένη φιλοσοφία. Η βιοηθική δεν εφαρμόζει ωστόσο γραμμικά στην πράξη καθιερωμένες και νεότερες ηθικές θεωρίες, αναλύει καταστάσεις με βάση οικουμενικές αξίες, σέβεται την ελευθερία της έρευνας, παίρνει σοβαρά υπόψη της τα επιστημονικά δεδομένα για το καλό του ανθρώπου και στήνει έννοιες- γέφυρες ανάμεσα στη θεωρία και την πράξη, όπως είναι η δικαιοσύνη και τα ανθρώπινα δικαιώματα. Κατά βάση χρησιμοποιεί ως κριτήριο αξιολόγησης και ελέγχου των τεχνο- επιστημονικών επιτευγμάτων τον σεβασμό των ανθρώπινων δικαιωμάτων που πιστεύεται ότι διακυβεύεται από τη βιοτεχνολογική επανάσταση όπως προκύπτει και από την πρόταξη του σεβασμού τους στις πρόσφατες ευρωπαϊκές και διεθνείς σχετικές διακηρύξεις.

Εχουν περάσει τριάντα χρόνια από την ορολογική γέννηση της 'βιοηθικής'. Η βιοηθική ενηλικιώθηκε, καθιερώθηκε, ιδώθηκε ως ασφαλιστική δικλείδα απέναντι στην ιλιγγιώδη τεχνο-επιστημονική πρόοδο, αλλά και ως τόπος συνάντησης και συμφιλίωσης επιστημονικής προόδου και αξιών. Το περιεχόμενό της ωστόσο εξακολουθεί να παραμένει για πολλούς αμφιλεγόμενo και αόριστo καθώς και η σχέση της με ό,τι γενικά και κοινότοπα θεωρούμε ως ηθική. Ο συλλογικός και συναινετικός χαρακτήρας της και η διεπιστημονική υφή της εμφανίζονται κάπως αντιφατικά με το διαπροσωπικό αλλά εσώτερα προσωπικό, καίτοι όχι ιδιωτικό, χαρακτήρα της ηθικής. Τα πρωτάκουστα, καινότροπα, και περιπτωσιακά τις περισσότερες φορές και σχεδόν πάντα συγκεκριμένα προβλήματα και διλήμματα που αντιμετωπίζει φαίνονται σε μερικούς να προσκρούουν στον δήθεν συντηρητικό, απολυτοκρατικό, γενικευτικό, μάλλον οικουμενικό, χαρακτήρα της ηθικής, κι έτσι δύσκολα να επιδέχονται `ηθικολογικές' λύσεις ή έστω αναλύσεις. Η αοριστία του όρου είναι εμφανέστερη στη γλώσσα μας, όπου με τη λέξη `ηθική', μερικές φορές εννοούμε αδιάκριτα αυτό που στις νεότερες γλώσσες αποδίδεται με δύο, κάποτε ευδιάκριτους καίτοι όχι πάντα μονοσήμαντους, όρους ως morals και ethics (Δραγώνα-Μονάχου 1995: 46-54). Οι όροι αυτοί κάποτε επικαλύπτονται ή χρησιμοποιούνται ιδιοσυγκρασιακά. Κατά βάση όμως διακρίνουν την ηθική (morals) ως κανονιστικό, πρακτικό λόγο, `λόγο πρώτης τάξης', `σύνολο θρησκευτικά και ιδεολογικά φορτισμένων κανόνων συλλογικής χρήσης', από την ηθική φιλοσοφία (ethics) ως `επιστήμη της ηθικότητας', απότοκο ορθολογικότητας, `στοχαστική, επιλεκτική, ανεκτική δραστηριότητα' (Gilly 2001: 10), ευρύτερο θεωρητικό λόγο, λογική, γλωσσική, εννοιολογική αλλά και ουσιαστική ανάλυση του ηθικού λόγου (discourse), των ηθικών εννοιών, κρίσεων και αρχών, σχεδόν συνώνυμη με τη `μεταηθική' και τη `μεταηθικότητα' (Δραγώνα-Μονάχου 1995: 56-57). Μην ξεχνάμε ότι, διαφορετικά από τον ελληνογενή όρο που συνδέεται με το `έθος' και που πρωτοβρίσκουμε ως επίθετο στον Αριστοτέλη και ως ουσιαστικό στους Στωικούς και το λατινογενή με αφετηρία το κικερώνειο mores, ο όρος 'βιοηθική', αλλά και το πράγμα, ξεκίνησε και καθιερώθηκε στον αγγλόφωνο κόσμο ως bioethics και αποδόθηκε ανάλογα σ' όλες τις γλώσσες και στη δική μας μάλιστα χωρίς διάκριση ανάμεσα στον κανονιστικό-πρακτικό και τον θεωρητικό χαρακτήρα της. Η βιοηθική, εμφανίστηκε στον κόσμο των διανοουμένων, των πολιτικών και της κοινής γνώμης , όπως ειπώθηκε (Gilly 2001: 11-13, 123), για να κάνει ακόμη πιο περίπλοκες `τις εύθραυστες σχέσεις ανάμεσα στις δύο αποδόσεις morale και ethique' ώστε, σύμφωνα με μια παράδοξη γλωσσική αλχημεία, ενώ η λατινογενής λέξη morale εξαφανίστηκε από τη γαλλική γλώσσα και τους μαυροπίνακες των σχολείων καταδικασμένη σε αχρηστία και παρελθοντισμό, η ελληνογενής λέξη ethique εμφανίζεται δυναμικά στολισμένη με το φως του μοντερνισμού', ενώ η ηθική είναι και πρέπει να μείνει προσωπική, `βλέμμα ενός ανθρώπου προς τον εαυτό του και τις πράξεις του και όχι μιας μικρής ομάδας στην κοινωνία'.

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Breyer says justices must adapt to Facebook world

Associated Press/Washington Post
November 16, 2010

Don't expect a Facebook friend request from Supreme Court Justice Stephen Breyer any time soon.

The 72-year-old justice said in a speech at Vanderbilt Law School on Tuesday that he was perplexed when he recently saw the film The Social Network about the origins of Facebook.

But Breyer said the film illustrates his argument that modern conditions - like the development of the social-networking site - should inform justices when interpreting a Constitution written in the 18th century.

"If I'm applying the First Amendment, I have to apply it to a world where there's an Internet, and there's Facebook, and there are movies like ... The Social Network, which I couldn't even understand," he said.

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"The Propriety of Liberty: Persons, Passions, and Judgement in Modern Political Thought"

by Duncan Kelly

In this book, Duncan Kelly excavates, from the history of modern political thought, a largely forgotten claim about liberty as a form of propriety. By rethinking the intellectual and historical foundations of modern accounts of freedom, he brings into focus how this major vision of liberty developed between the seventeenth and the nineteenth centuries.

In his framework, celebrated political writers, including John Locke, Montesquieu, Adam Smith, John Stuart Mill, and Thomas Hill Green pursue the claim that freedom is best understood as a form of responsible agency or propriety, and they do so by reconciling key moral and philosophical claims with classical and contemporary political theory. Their approach broadly assumes that only those persons who appropriately regulate their conduct can be thought of as free and responsible. At the same time, however, they recognize that such internal forms of self-propriety must be judged within the wider context of social and political life. Kelly shows how the intellectual and practical demands of such a synthesis require these great writers to consider freedom as part of a broader set of arguments about the nature of personhood, the potentially irrational impact of the passions, and the obstinate problems of individual and political judgement. By exploring these relationships, The Propriety of Liberty not only revises the intellectual history of modern political thought, but also sheds light on contemporary debates about freedom and agency.

Duncan Kelly is university senior lecturer in political theory in the Department of Politics and International Studies, University of Cambridge, and fellow of Jesus College, Cambridge. He is the author of The State of the Political.

Gingrich: Remaining Iowa justices should resign

Des Moines Register
November 16, 2010

Former U.S. House Speaker Newt Gingrich, in West Des Moines for a book-signing today, said the four remaining Iowa Supreme Court justices should resign.

Gingrich said it was clear after the three justices on the ballot were defeated that the other four also would have lost their jobs. Bob Vander Plaats, who headed the campaign to defeat justices, has made similar remarks.

“I mean it’s clear if they had been on the ballot, they’d have been repealed,” Gingrich said.

He said the integrity and authority of the system comes from the consent of the governed, “then the governed have indicated they don’t agree with this court … so I think they have any sense of integrity about protecting the court, they’ll step down.”

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Abortion Common Ground: A Pro-Life Agenda

by William Saletan

Slate
November 16, 2010

A few weeks ago, pro-life and pro-choice thinkers met at Princeton's University Center for Human Values for an open-minded discussion of their differences and possible areas of collaboration. There was plenty of disagreement, and in the weeks since, there's been lots of sniping back and forth about whether the conference was slanted, what was agreed to, and the perfidy of the other side. But the conference did illuminate several steps each side could take to advance a common agenda. Today I'll examine the lessons for pro-lifers. Tomorrow I'll examine the lessons for pro-choicers.

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Image Rights vs. Free Speech in Video Game Suit

New York Times
November 15, 2010

When Sam Keller, a former quarterback at Arizona State, sued the video game publisher Electronic Arts last year, he was seeking compensation for himself and other college athletes whose names were not used but whose images he contended were being illegally used by the company.

But to the media conglomerates, athletes, actors, First Amendment advocates and others who have recently weighed in on the case, Keller’s lawsuit is about much more than video games. The outcome of a recent appeal filed by Electronic Arts, their lawyers say, could rewrite the rules that dictate how much ownership public figures have over their images — and the extent to which outside parties, including media and entertainment companies — can profit from them.

The case is drawing attention because it gets to the heart of a highly contested legal question: when should a person’s right to control his image trump the free-speech rights of others to use it?

“It’s one of the most important clashes in all of First Amendment law, and one of the more unsettled areas,” said David L. Hudson Jr., a scholar with the First Amendment Center at Vanderbilt University. “I think it’s an area that is crying out for Supreme Court review in the right case.”

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The Limits of Constitutional Democracy

Edited by Jeffrey K. Tulis and Stephen Macedo

Constitutional democracy is at once a flourishing idea filled with optimism and promise--and an enterprise fraught with limitations. Uncovering the reasons for this ambivalence, this book looks at the difficulties of constitutional democracy, and reexamines fundamental questions: What is constitutional democracy? When does it succeed or fail? Can constitutional democracies conduct war? Can they preserve their values and institutions while addressing new forms of global interdependence? The authors gathered here interrogate constitutional democracy's meaning in order to illuminate its future.

The book examines key themes--the issues of constitutional failure; the problem of emergency power and whether constitutions should be suspended when emergencies arise; the dilemmas faced when constitutions provide and restrict executive power during wartime; and whether constitutions can adapt to such globalization challenges as immigration, religious resurgence, and nuclear arms proliferation.

In addition to the editors, the contributors are Sotirios Barber, Joseph Bessette, Mark Brandon, Daniel Deudney, Christopher Eisgruber, James Fleming, William Harris II, Ran Hirschl, Gary Jacobsohn, Benjamin Kleinerman, Jan-Werner Müller, Kim Scheppele, Rogers Smith, Adrian Vermeule, and Mariah Zeisberg.

Jeffrey K. Tulis teaches political science at the University of Texas, Austin. His books include The Rhetorical Presidency (Princeton). Stephen Macedo is the Laurance S. Rockefeller Professor of Politics at Princeton University. His numerous books include Democracy at Risk.

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A Defeat for Checks and Balances

New York Times
Editorial
November 12, 2010

The Supreme Court’s decision on Friday to allow the “don’t ask, don’t tell” policy to remain in effect is a victory for theory over reality and a defeat for America’s system of checks and balances.

It also underscores the bravery and competence of Virginia Phillips, the federal judge who mustered logic and persuasive evidence in September when she struck down the statute enacting the policy. She did the same in October when she issued a ban on its enforcement.

The Supreme Court’s order included no explanation, so it’s sensible to look for that in the Justice Department filing that urged the court to rule as it did. Repeatedly, it mentioned repeal of the law by Congress and the process under way in the executive branch laying the groundwork for that. It said the wrong way to overturn the law is by “judicial invalidation” and the right way is by “repeal of an act of Congress by Congress itself.”

Sometimes the courts have to act when Congress lacks the sense or the courage to do so. The Senate could have joined the House in repealing the antigay law in September. It did not. Given the sharp rightward turn of Congress in the elections, how can the Justice Department now make that argument with a straight face?

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The Oklahoma Referendum Prohibiting State Courts from Applying International or Sharia Law

by Marci A. Hamilton

FindLaw
November 11, 2010

On Election Day, Oklahoma voters approved a referendum that serves as an interesting microcosm of some of the most difficult challenges facing the United States now. The referendum amended the state constitution (via State Question Number 755) to forbid Oklahoma's courts from applying international law or Sharia law (also known as Islamic law) in any case before them.

The international-law prohibition is a fascinating attempt by Oklahomans to stave off the increasing and unavoidable globalization of our lives. In turn, the prohibition on Sharia law seems to be Oklahomans' reaction to the demonic Taliban and al-Qaeda forces that are pledged to end our way of life and America itself.

Most Americans understand Sharia law to be the motivating doctrine behind the violently radical Islamicists, and one can hardly fault the Oklahomans for seeking to build a legal barrier around their state to keep terrorism out. While the prohibition on the use of international law also presents interesting issues, I will focus here on the Sharia law prohibition. It is problematic.

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For an opposite position see the editorial of Washington Times (November 16, 2010)

A Blow to the Courts

New York Times
Editorial
November 8, 2010

Like the rest of this year’s political campaign, state judicial elections were awash in cash and blaring attack ads. The spectacle raises legitimate doubts about the impartiality of even the most respected judges.

Among last Tuesday’s alarming results was the defeat of three Iowa Supreme Court justices who had joined in last year’s unanimous ruling to permit same-sex marriage there. The three sought to remain above the fray. They did not raise money and made few public appearances. A group supporting them, Fair Courts for Us, reported spending about $400,000.

Their supporters were far outgunned by the National Organization for Marriage, the American Family Association and other groups that spent at least $1 million urging voters to oust them. The 2009 ruling will stand. But the judges’ defeat is sure to make other elected judges shy from rendering controversial rulings, especially before elections.

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Jeffrey Brand-Ballard, "Limits of Legality: The Ethics of Lawless Judging"

Law and Politics Book Review
Vol. 20 No. 11 (November, 2010) pp.590-594

Reviewed by Emmett Macfarlane, Visiting Researcher and Postdoctoral Fellow, Harvard Law School, Harvard University

Normative accounts of judging typically offer arguments regarding how judges ought to apply the law. This vast literature contains various competing theories of interpretation, adjudication or of the law itself. LIMITS OF LEGALITY advances a complex and controversial argument about whether judges are, in fact, obligated to render what they view as the legally required decision when they have strong moral objections. Jeffrey Brand-Ballard’s book, rooted in the philosophy of ethics, tackles a question that most judges, lawyers and legal scholars take for granted: are judges morally obligated to adhere to the law?

Brand-Ballard’s book is a finely detailed, philosophically sophisticated and almost exhaustingly thorough account of legal and moral perspectives concerning judicial fidelity to the law. The interdisciplinary nature of the work is impressive; it tackles a vast array of topics ranging from judicial ethics and moral reasoning to concepts explored in legal theory, including the rule of law and the judicial role. While controversial, the author’s central argument is highly nuanced and often carefully circumscribed. Brand-Ballard contends that even in reasonably just legal systems judges are not morally obligated to adhere to the law when they believe the legally-required result is unjust. His argument is somewhat conditional: judicial deviation from the law is not limited only to exceptional cases that are viewed as “extremely” unjust; however, judges should nevertheless avoid deviating in all “suboptimal-result” cases or they risk damaging the rule of law. This component of the argument, while providing balance to the author’s highly contentious central claim, becomes problematic in the second part of the book where Brand-Ballard expounds upon the normative structure specifying how judges can deviate while protecting the rule of law.

LIMITS OF LEGALITY consists of two parts. Part I explores conventional arguments that judges have a moral duty to adhere to the law. It begins with an examination of judicial authority premised on the natural rights of judges and the idea that the state authorizes them to use force in the performance of their duties (chapter 2). Brand-Ballard argues that our natural rights to use nondefensive force (to seek restitution or to punish for perceived wrongs, for example) are morally prohibited in civil society, but that the law creates an exception for state actors like judges to exercise such force. Yet, he argues that many, if not most, people go too far in adopting the “undermining principle,” a standard which holds that if the law requires a public official to use force in a given situation, then she has no moral reason not to use it (p.34).

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Randall Peerenboom, "Judicial Independence in China: Lessons for Global Rule of Law Promotion"

Law and Politics Book Review
Vol. 20 No. 11 (November, 2010) pp.595-601

Reviewed by Michael W. Dowdle, National University of Singapore Faculty of Law.

"Judicial independence” is a difficult metaphor. No effective judiciary is truly independent. Judicial effectiveness relies more on interdependence than on independence per se. Of course, when looking at familiar constitutional systems, this distinction – between independence and interdependence – is obscured by our cozy familiarities. In the United States, for example, we celebrate the effects of life-time tenure, but ignore those of the political vetting processes that take place prior to nomination.

All in all, however, our judicial system works, and that alone appears sufficient to give us confidence in the ultimate independence of our judiciary. But problems arise when we apply this metaphor to what we might call “alien” constitutional systems – constitutional environments whose fundamental organization is incompatible with our constitutional presumptions. Here, the relationship between constitutional structure and constitutional consequent are often complicated by the presence of unfamiliar social dynamics that are unaccounted for by the standard constitutional anticipations that derive from our own understandings of our own constitutional systems. Understanding these alien systems requires us to approach them as distinctive systems in their own right, and not as simply ersatz reproductions of our own.

This is what Randall Peerenboom’s edited volume, JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE IN CHINA: LESSONS FOR GLOBAL RULE OF LAW PROMOTION, does in the context of the People’s Republic of China [PRC]. The PRC’s is clearly an alien constitutional structure, as we defined the term above. It is not founded on multi-party, democratic elections. It does not, for the most part, work to limit governmental power or to protect the politically vulnerable. It does not revolve around an ultimate intention to preserve one’s exercise and enjoyment of those liberal rights that many regard as fundamental to being “human.” It affirmatively rejects the concept of “separation of powers” as a foundational organizing principle.

And relatedly, China’s constitutional system – if one even dares call it that – is routinely if not invariably seen as one in which the judiciary is not meaningfully “independent.” But what does that mean? What would or should judicial independence look like in the context of China’s constitutional system? What would or should it contribute to that system? These are questions that have rarely been asked – because we have tended to presume that their answers are the same with regards to China as they are with regards to the mature constitutional systems of the advanced industrialized democracies of the North Atlantic. Peerenboom’s volume suggests that this presumption is fallacious.

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"Shakespeare's Imaginary Constitution: Late Elizabethan Politics and the Theatre of Law" by Paul Raffield

Through an examination of six plays by Shakespeare, the author presents an innovative analysis of political developments in the last decade of Elizabethan rule and their representation in poetic drama of the period. The playhouses of London in the 1590s provided a distinctive forum for discourse and dissemination of nascent political ideas. Shakespeare exploited the unique capacity of theatre to humanise contemporary debate concerning the powers of the crown and the extent to which these were limited by law. The autonomous subject of law is represented in the plays considered here as a sentient political being whose natural rights and liberties found an analogue in the narratives of common law, as recorded in juristic texts and law reports of the early modern era. Each chapter reflects a particular aspect of constitutional development in the late-Elizabethan state. These include abuse of the royal prerogative by the crown and its agents; the emergence of a politicised middle class citizenry, empowered by the ascendancy of contract law; the limitations imposed by the courts on the lawful extent of divinely ordained kingship; the natural and rational authority of unwritten lex terrae; the poetic imagination of the judiciary and its role in shaping the constitution; and the fusion of temporal and spiritual jurisdiction in the person of the monarch. The book advances original insights into the complex and agonistic relationship between theatre, politics, and law. The plays discussed offer persuasive images both of the crown's absolutist tendencies and of alternative polities predicated upon classical and humanist principles of justice, equity, and community.

It is now canon in progressive U.S. legal scholarship that to focus solely on the text of our Constitution is myopic. We look as well for "constitutional moments", moments when the zeitgeist is so transformed that our fundamental legal charter changes with it. In this breathtakingly erudite book, Paul Raffield argues that the late-Elizabethan period was such a "constitutional moment" in England, a moment literally "played out" for the polity by the greatest dramatist of all time. A lawyer and a thespian, Raffield handles both legal and literary sources with exquisite care. As with the works of the Old Masters, one dwells pleasurably on each detail until their cumulative force presses one backward to see the canvas in its sudden, glorious entirety. A major achievement.

Kenji Yoshino, Chief Justice Earl Warren Professor of Constitutional Law, NYU School of Law